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Abstract
Most modern systems strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration:
making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We initiate
a study of the interplay between exploration and competition—how such systems balance the
exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here the users play three distinct roles:
they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are
self-interested agents which choose among the competing systems.
In our model, we consider competition between two multi-armed bandit algorithms faced with
the same bandit instance. Users arrive one by one and choose among the two algorithms, so that
each algorithm makes progress if and only if it is chosen. We ask whether and to what extent
competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms. We investigate this issue for
several models of user response, as we vary the degree of rationality and competitiveness in
the model. Our findings are closely related to the “competition vs. innovation” relationship, a
well-studied theme in economics.
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1 Introduction
Learning from interactions with users is ubiquitous in modern customer-facing systems,
from product recommendations to web search to spam detection to content selection to fine-
tuning the interface. Many systems purposefully implement exploration: making potentially
suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. Randomized controlled trials,
a.k.a. A/B testing, are an industry standard, with a number of companies such as Optimizely
offering tools and platforms to facilitate them. Many companies use more sophisticated
exploration methodologies based on multi-armed bandits, a well-known theoretical framework
for exploration and making decisions under uncertainty.
Systems that engage in exploration typically need to compete against one another; most
importantly, they compete for users. This creates an interesting tension between exploration
and competition. In a nutshell, while exploring may be essential for improving the service
tomorrow, it may degrade quality and make users leave today, in which case there will be no
users to learn from! Thus, users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate
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Figure 1 Inverted-U relationship between rationality/competitiveness and algorithms.
revenue, they generate data for the systems to learn from, and they are self-interested agents
which choose among the competing systems.
We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition. The main high-
level question is: whether and to what extent competition incentivizes adoption of
better exploration algorithms. This translates into a number of more concrete questions.
While it is commonly assumed that better learning technology always helps, is this so for
our setting? In other words, would a better learning algorithm result in higher utility for
a principal? Would it be used in an equilibrium of the “competition game”? Also, does
competition lead to better social welfare compared to a monopoly? We investigate these
questions for several models, as we vary the capacity of users to make rational decisions
(rationality) and the severity of competition between the learning systems (competitiveness).
The two are controlled by the same “knob” in our models; such coupling is not unusual in
the literature, e.g., see [18].
On a high level, our contributions can be framed in terms of the “inverted-U relationship”
between rationality/competitiveness and the quality of adopted algorithms (see Figure 1).
Our model. We define a game in which two firms (principals) simultaneously engage
in exploration and compete for users (agents). These two processes are interlinked, as
exploration decisions are experienced by users and informed by their feedback. We need to
specify several conceptual pieces: how the principals and agents interact, what is the machine
learning problem faced by each principal, and what is the information structure. Each piece
can get rather complicated in isolation, let alone jointly, so we strive for simplicity. Thus,
the basic model is as follows:
A new agent arrives in each round t = 1, 2, . . ., and chooses among the two principals.
The principal chooses an action (e.g., a list of web search results to show to the agent),
the user experiences this action, and reports a reward. All agents have the same “decision
rule” for choosing among the principals given the available information.
Each principal faces a very basic and well-studied version of the multi-armed bandit
problem: for each arriving agent, it chooses from a fixed set of actions (a.k.a. arms) and
receives a reward drawn independently from a fixed distribution specific to this action.
Principals simultaneously announce their learning algorithms before round 1, and cannot
change them afterwards. There is a common Bayesian prior on the rewards (but the
realized reward distributions are not observed by the principals or the agents). Agents do
not receive any other information. Each principal only observes agents that chose him.
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Technical results. Our results depend crucially on agents’ “decision rule” for choosing
among the principals. The simplest and perhaps the most obvious rule is to select the
principal which maximizes their expected utility; we refer to it as HardMax. We find that
HardMax is not conducive to adopting better algorithms. In fact, each principal’s dominant
strategy is to do no purposeful exploration whatsoever, and instead always choose an action
that maximizes expected reward given the current information; we call this algorithm
DynamicGreedy. While this algorithm may potentially try out different actions over time and
acquire useful information, it is known to be dramatically bad in many important cases of
multi-armed bandits — precisely because it does not explore on purpose, and may therefore
fail to discover best/better actions. Further, we show that HardMax is very sensitive to
tie-breaking when both principals have exactly the same expected utility according to agents’
beliefs. If tie-breaking is probabilistically biased — say, principal 1 is always chosen with
probability strictly larger than 12 — then this principal has a simple “winning strategy” no
matter what the other principal does.
We relax HardMax to allow each principal to be chosen with some fixed baseline probability.
One intuitive interpretation is that there are “random agents” who choose a principal uniformly
at random, and each arriving agent is either HardMax or “random” with some fixed probability.
We call this model HardMax&Random. We find that better algorithms help in a big way:
a sufficiently better algorithm is guaranteed to win all non-random agents after an initial
learning phase. While the precise notion of “sufficiently better algorithm” is rather subtle, we
note that commonly known “smart” bandit algorithms typically defeat the commonly known
“naive” ones, and the latter typically defeat DynamicGreedy. However, there is a substantial
caveat: one can defeat any algorithm by interleaving it with DynamicGreedy. This has two
undesirable corollaries: a better algorithm may sometimes lose, and a pure Nash equilibrium
typically does not exist.
We further relax the decision rule so that the probability of choosing a given principal
varies smoothly as a function of the difference between principals’ expected rewards; we call
it SoftMax. For this model, the “better algorithm wins” result holds under much weaker
assumptions on what constitutes a better algorithm. This is the most technical result of
the paper. The competition in this setting is necessarily much more relaxed: typically, both
principals attract approximately half of the agents as time goes by (but a better algorithm
may attract slightly more).
All results extend to a much more general version of the multi-armed bandit problem
in which the principal may observe additional feedback before and/or after each decision,
as long as the feedback distribution does not change over time. In most results, principal’s
utility may depend on both the market share and agents’ rewards.
Economic interpretation. The inverted-U relationship between the severity of competition
among firms and the quality of technologies that they adopt is a familiar theme in the
economics literature (e.g., [2, 41]).1 We find it illuminating to frame our contributions in a
similar manner, as illustrated in Figure 1.
1 The literature frames this relationship as one between “competition” and “innovation”. In this context,
“innovation” refers to adoption of a better technology, at a substantial R&D expense to a given firm.
It is not salient whether similar ideas and/or technologies already exist outside the firm. It is worth
noting that adoption of exploration algorithms tends to require substantial R&D effort in practice, even
if the algorithms themselves are well-known in the research literature; see [1] for an example of such
R&D effort.
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Our models differ in terms of rationality in agents’ decision-making: from fully ra-
tional decisions with HardMax to relaxed rationality with HardMax&Random to an even more
relaxed rationality with SoftMax. The same distinctions also control the severity of competi-
tion between the principals: from cut-throat competition with HardMax to a more relaxed
competition with HardMax&Random, to an even more relaxed competition with SoftMax.
Indeed, with HardMax you lose all customers as soon as you fall behind in performance,
with HardMax&Random you get some small market share no matter what, and with SoftMax
you are further guaranteed a market share close to 12 as long as your performance is not
much worse than the competition. The uniform choice among principals corresponds to no
rationality and no competition.
We identify the inverted-U relationship in the spirit of Figure 1 that is driven by the
rationality/competitiveness distinctions outlined above: from HardMax to HardMax&Random
to SoftMax to Uniform. We also find another, technically different inverted-U relationship
which zeroes in on the HardMax&Random model. We vary rationality/competitiveness inside
this model, and track the marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm.
These inverted-U relationships arise for a fundamentally different reason, compared to
the existing literature on “competition vs. innovation.” In the literature, better technology
always helps in a competitive environment, other things being equal. Thus, the tradeoff is
between the costs of improving the technology and the benefits that the improved technology
provides in the competition. Meanwhile, we find that a better exploration algorithm may
sometimes perform much worse under competition, even in the absence of R&D costs.
Discussion. We capture some pertinent features of reality while ignoring some others for
the sake of tractability. Most notably, we assume that agents do not receive any information
about other agents’ rewards after the game starts. In the final analysis, this assumption
makes agents’ behavior independent of a particular realization of the Bayesian prior, and
therefore enables us to summarize each learning algorithm via its Bayesian-expected rewards
(as opposed to detailed performance on the particular realizations of the prior). Such
summarization is essential for formulating lucid and general analytic results, let alone proving
them. It is a major open question whether one can incorporate signals about other agents’
rewards and obtain a tractable model.
We also make a standard assumption that agents are myopic: they do not worry about
how their actions impact their future utility. In particular, they do not attempt to learn over
time, to second-guess or game future agents, or to manipulate principal’s learning algorithm.
We believe this is a typical case in practice, in part because agent’s influence tend to be
small compared to the overall system. We model this simply by assuming that each agent
only arrives once.
Much of the challenge in this paper, both conceptual and technical, was in setting up
the right model and the matching theorems, and not only in proving the theorems. Apart
from making the modeling choices described above, it was crucial to interpret the results
and intuitions from the literature on multi-armed bandits so as to formulate meaningful
assumptions on bandit algorithms and Bayesian priors which are productive in our setting.
Open questions. How to incorporate signals about the other agents’ rewards? One needs
to reason about how exact or coarse these signals are, and how the agents update their
beliefs after receiving them. Also, one may need to allow principals’ learning algorithms to
respond to updates about the other principal’s performance. (Or not, since this is not how
learning algorithms are usually designed!) A clean, albeit idealized, model would be that (i)
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each agent learns her exact expected reward from each principal before she needs to choose
which principal to go to, but (ii) these updates are invisible to the principals. Even then,
one needs to argue about the competition on particular realizations of the Bayesian prior,
which appears very challenging.
Another promising extension is to heterogeneous agents. Then the agents’ choices are
impacted by their idiosyncratic signals/beliefs, instead of being entirely determined by
priors and/or signals about the average performance. It would be particularly interesting
to investigate the emergence of specialization: whether/when an algorithm learns to target
specific population segments in order to compete against a more powerful “incumbent”.
Map of the paper. We survey related work (Section 2), lay out the model and preliminaries
(Section 3), and proceed to analyze the three main models, HardMax, HardMax&Random and
SoftMax (in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively). We discuss economic implications in Section 7.
Appendix A provides some pertinent background on multi-armed bandits. Appendix B gives
a broad example to support an assumption in our model.
2 Related work
Multi-armed bandits (MAB) is a particularly elegant and tractable abstraction for tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation: essentially, between acquisition and usage of informa-
tion. MAB problems have been studied in Economics, Operations Research and Computer
Science for many decades; see [13, 20, 39] for background on regret-minimizing and Bayesian
formulations, respectively. A discussion of industrial applications of MAB can be found in
[1].
The literature on MAB is vast and multi-threaded. The most related thread concerns
regret-minimizing MAB formulations with IID rewards [29, 4]. This thread includes “smart”
MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as UCB1 [4] and Successive
Elimination [16], and “naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation,
including explore-first and -Greedy e.g., see [39].
The three-way tradeoff between exploration, exploitation and incentives has been studied
in several other settings: incentivizing exploration in a recommendation system [14, 17, 28,
30, 11, 9, 31], dynamic auctions e.g., [3, 10, 25], pay-per-click ad auctions with unknown
click probabilities e.g., [8, 15, 7], coordinating search and matching by self-interested agents
[27], as well as human computation e.g., [22, 19, 38].
[12, 26, 21] studied models with self-interested agents jointly performing exploration, with
no principal to coordinate them.
There is a superficial similarity (in name only) between this paper and the line of work
on “dueling bandits” e.g., [43, 44]. The latter is not about competing bandit algorithms, but
rather about scenarios where in each round two arms are chosen to be presented to a user,
and the algorithm only observes which arm has “won the duel”.
Our setting is closely related to the “dueling algorithms” framework [24] which studies
competition between two principals, each running an algorithm for the same problem.
However, this work considers algorithms for oﬄine / full input scenarios, whereas we focus
on online machine learning and the explore-exploit-incentives tradeoff therein. Also, this
work specifically assumes binary payoffs (i.e., win or lose) for the principals.
Other related work in economics. The competition vs. innovation relationship and the
inverted-U shape thereof have been introduced in a classic book [37], and remained an
important theme in the literature ever since e.g., [2, 41]. Production costs aside, this
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literature treats innovation as a priori beneficial for the firm. Our setting is very different, as
innovation in exploration algorithms may potentially hurt the firm.
A line of work on platform competition, starting with [36], concerns competition between
firms (platforms) that improve as they attract more users (network effect); see [42] for a
recent survey. This literature is not concerned with innovation, and typically models network
effects exogenously, whereas in our model network effects are endogenous: they are created
by MAB algorithms, an essential part of the model.
Relaxed versions of rationality similar to ours are found in several notable lines of work.
For example, “random agents” (a.k.a. noise traders) can side-step the “no-trade theorem”
[32], a famous impossibility result in financial economics. The SoftMax model is closely
related to the literature on product differentiation, starting from [23], see [34] for a notable
later paper.
There is a large literature on non-existence of equilibria due to small deviations (which is
related to the corresponding result for HardMax&Random), starting with [35] in the context
of health insurance markets. Notable recent papers [40, 6] emphasize the distinction between
HardMax and versions of SoftMax.
3 Our model and preliminaries
Principals and agents. There are two principals and T agents. The game proceeds in
rounds (we will sometimes refer to them as global rounds). In each round t ∈ [T ], the
following interaction takes place. A new agent arrives and chooses one of the two principals.
The principal chooses a recommendation: an action at ∈ A, where A is a fixed set of actions
(same for both principals and all rounds). The agent follows this recommendation, receives a
reward rt ∈ [0, 1], and reports it back to the principal.
The rewards are i.i.d. with a common prior. More formally, for each action a ∈ A there
is a parametric family ψa(·) of reward distributions, parameterized by the mean reward
µa. (The paradigmatic case is 0-1 rewards with a given expectation.) The mean reward
vector µ = (µa : a ∈ A) is drawn from prior distribution Pmean before round 1. Whenever a
given action a ∈ A is chosen, the reward is drawn independently from distribution ψa(µa).
The prior Pmean and the distributions (ψa(·) : a ∈ A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on
rewards, denoted P.
Each principal commits to a learning algorithm for making recommendations. This
algorithm follows a protocol of multi-armed bandits (MAB). Namely, the algorithm proceeds
in time-steps:2 each time it is called, it outputs a chosen action a ∈ A and then inputs the
reward for this action. The algorithm is called only in global rounds when the corresponding
principal is chosen.
The information structure is as follows. The prior P is known to everyone. The mean
rewards µa are not revealed to anybody. Each agent knows both principals’ algorithms,
and the global round when (s)he arrives, but not the rewards of the previous agents. Each
principal is completely unaware of the rounds when the other is chosen.
Some terminology. The two principals are called “Principal 1” and “Principal 2”. The
algorithm of principal i ∈ {1, 2} is called “algorithm i” and denoted algi. The agent in
global round t is called “agent t”; the chosen principal is denoted it.
Throughout, E[·] denotes expectation over all applicable randomness.
2 These time-steps will sometimes be referred to as local steps/rounds, so as to distinguish them from
“global rounds” defined before. We will omit the local vs. local distinction when clear from the context.
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Bayesian-expected rewards. Consider the performance of a given algorithm algi, i ∈ {1, 2},
when it is run in isolation (i.e., without competition, just as a bandit algorithm). Let rewi(n)
denote its Bayesian-expected reward for the n-th step.
Now, going back to our game, fix global round t and let ni(t) denote the number of global
rounds before t in which this principal is chosen. Then:
E[rt | principal i is chosen in round t and ni(t) = n] = rewi(n+ 1) (∀n ∈ N).
Agents’ response. Each agent t chooses principal it as as follows: it chooses a distribution
over the principals, and then draws independently from this distribution. Let pt be the
probability of choosing principal 1 according to this distribution. Below we specify pt; we
need to be careful so as to avoid a circular definition.
Let It be the information available to agent t before the round. Assume It suffices to
form posteriors for quantities ni(t), i ∈ {1, 2}, denote them by Ni,t. Note that the Bayesian
expected reward of each principal i is a function only of the number rounds he was chosen
by the agents, so the posterior mean reward for each principal i can be written as
PMRi(t) := E[rt | It and it = i] = E[rewi(ni(t) + 1) | It] = E
n∼Ni,t
[rewi(n+ 1)].
This quantity represents the posterior mean reward for principal i at round t, according to
information It; hence the notation PMR. In general, probability pt is defined by the posterior
mean rewards PMRi(t) for both principals. We assume a somewhat more specific shape:
pt = fresp ( PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) ) . (1)
Here fresp : [−1, 1] → [0, 1] is the response function, which is the same for all agents. We
assume that the response function is known to all agents.
To make the model well-defined, it remains to argue that information It is indeed sufficient
to form posteriors on n1(t) and n2(t). This can be easily seen using induction on t.
Since all agents arrive with identical information (other than knowing which global round
they arrive in), it follows that all agents have identical posteriors for ni,t (for a given principal
i and a given global round t). This posterior is denoted Ni,t.
Response functions. We use the response function fresp to characterize the amount of
rationality and competitiveness in our model. We assume that fresp is monotonically non-
decreasing, is larger than 12 on the interval (0, 1], and smaller than
1
2 on the interval [−1, 0).
Beyond that, we consider three specific models, listed in the order of decreasing rationality
and competitiveness (see Figure 2):
HardMax: fresp equals 0 on the interval [−1, 0) and 1 on the interval (0, 1]. In other words,
the agents will deterministically choose the principal with the higher posterior mean
reward.
HardMax&Random: fresp equals 0 on the interval [−1, 0) and 1− 0 on the interval (0, 1],
where 0 ∈ (0, 12 ) are some positive constants. In words, each agent is a HardMax agent
with probability 1− 20, and with the remaining probability she makes a random choice.
SoftMax: fresp(·) lies in the interval [0, 1− 0], 0 > 0, and is “smooth” around 0 (in the
sense defined precisely in Section 6).
We say that fresp is symmetric if fresp(−x) + fresp(x) = 1 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. This implies
fair tie-breaking: fresp(0) = 12 .
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∆t := PMR1(t)− PMR2(t)
pt = prob. of choosing principal 1
1/2
1
0 1−1
Figure 2 The three models for agents’ response function: HardMax is thick blue, HardMax&Random
is slim red, and SoftMax is the dashed curve.
MAB algorithms. We characterize the inherent quality of an MAB algorithm in terms of its
Bayesian Instantaneous Regret (henceforth, BIR), a standard notion from machine learning:
BIR(n) := E
µ∼Pmean
[
max
a∈A
µa
]
− rew(n), (2)
where rew(n) is the Bayesian-expected reward of the algorithm for the n-th step, when the
algorithm is run in isolation. We are primarily interested in how BIR scales with n; we treat
K, the number of arms, as a constant unless specified otherwise.
We will emphasize several specific algorithms or classes thereof:
“smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as UCB1 [4]
and Successive Elimination [16]. These algorithms achieve BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/2) for all
priors and all (or all but a very few) steps n. This bound is known to be tight for any
fixed n.3
“naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, such as Explore-then-
Exploit and -Greedy. These algorithms have dedicated rounds in which they explore by
choosing an action uniformly at random. When these rounds are known in advance, the
algorithm suffers constant BIR in such rounds. When the “exploration rounds” are instead
randomly chosen by the algorithm, one can usually guarantee an inverse-polynomial
upper bound BIR, but not as good as the one above: namely, BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/3). This
is the best possible upper bound on BIR for the two algorithms mentioned above.
DynamicGreedy: at each step, recommends the best action according to the current
posterior: an action a with the highest posterior expected reward E[µa | I], where I is the
information available to the algorithm so far. DynamicGreedy has (at least) a constant
BIR for some reasonable priors, i.e., BIR(n) > Ω(1).
StaticGreedy: always recommends the prior best action,i.e., an action a with the highest
prior mean reward Eµ∼Pmean [µa]. This algorithm typically has constant BIR.
We focus on MAB algorithms such that BIR(n) is non-increasing; we call such algorithms
monotone. While some reasonable MAB algorithms may occasionally violate monotonicity,
they can usually be easily modified so that monotonicity violations either vanish altogether,
or only occur at very specific rounds (so that agents are extremely unlikely to exploit them
in practice).
More background and examples can be found in Appendix A. In particular, we prove
that DynamicGreedy is monotone.
3 This follows from the lower-bound analysis in [5].
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Competition game between principals. Some of our results explicitly study the game
between the two principals. We model it as a simultaneous-move game: before the first agent
arrives, each principal commits to an MAB algorithm. Thus, choosing a pure strategy in this
game corresponds to choosing an MAB algorithm (and, implicitly, announcing this algorithm
to the agents).
Principal’s utility is primarily defined as the market share, i.e., the number of agents
that chose this principal. Principals are risk-neutral, in the sense that they optimize their
expected utility.
Assumptions on the prior. We make some technical assumptions for the sake of simplicity.
First, each action a has a positive probability of being the best action according to the prior:
∀a ∈ A : Pr
µ∼Pmean
[µa > µa′ ∀a′ ∈ A] > 0. (3)
Second, posterior mean rewards of actions are pairwise distinct almost surely. That is,
the history h at any step of an MAB algorithm4 satisfies
E[µa | h] 6= E[µa′ | h] ∀a, a′ ∈ A, (4)
except at a set of histories of probability 0. In particular, prior mean rewards of actions are
pairwise distinct: E[µa] 6= E[µ′a] for any a, a′ ∈ A.
We provide two examples for which property (4) is ‘generic’, in the sense that it can be
enforced almost surely by a small random perturbation of the prior. Both examples focus on
0-1 rewards and priors Pmean that are independent across arms. The first example assumes
Beta priors on the mean rewards, and is very easy.5 The second example assumes that mean
rewards have a finite support, see Appendix B for details.
Some more notation. Without loss of generality, we label actions as A = [K] and sort
them according to their prior mean rewards, so that E[µ1] > E[µ2] > . . . > E[µK ].
Fix principal i ∈ {1, 2} and (local) step n. The arm chosen by algorithm algi at this step
is denoted ai,n, and the corresponding BIR is denoted BIRi(n). History of algi up to this
step is denoted Hi,n.
Write PMR(a | E) = E[µa | E] for posterior mean reward of action a given event E.
3.1 Generalizations
Our results can be extended compared to the basic model described above.
First, unless specified otherwise, our results allow a more general notion of principal’s
utility that can depend on both the market share and agents’ rewards. Namely, principal i
collects Ui(rt) units of utility in each global round t when she is chosen (and 0 otherwise),
where Ui(·) is some fixed non-decreasing function with Ui(0) > 0. In a formula,
Ui :=
∑T
t=1 1{it=i} · Ui(rr). (5)
4 The history of an MAB algorithm at a given step comprises the chosen actions and the observed rewards
in all previous steps in the execution of this algorithm.
5 Suppose the rewards are Bernouli r.v. and the mean reward µa for each arm a is drawn from some
Beta distribution Beta(αa, βa). Given any history that contains ha number of heads and ta number of
tails from arm a, the posterior mean reward is αa+haαa+ha+βa+ta . Note that ha and ta take integer values.
Therefore, perturbing the parameters αa and βa independently with any continuous noise will induce a
prior with property (4) with probability 1.
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Second, our results carry over, with little or no modification of the proofs, to much more
general versions of MAB, as long as it satisfies the i.i.d. property. In each round, an algorithm
can see a context before choosing an action (as in contextual bandits) and/or additional
feedback other than the reward after the reward is chosen (as in, e.g., semi-bandits), as
long as the contexts are drawn from a fixed distribution, and the (reward, feedback) pair
is drawn from a fixed distribution that depends only on the context and the chosen action.
The Bayesian prior P needs to be a more complicated object, to make sure that PMR and
BIR are well-defined. Mean rewards may also have a known structure, such as Lipschitzness,
convexity, or linearity; such structure can be incorporated via P. All these extensions have
been studied extensively in the literature on MAB, and account for a substantial segment
thereof; see [13] for background and details.
3.2 Chernoff Bounds
We use an elementary concentration inequality known as Chernoff Bounds, in a formulation
from [33].
I Theorem 1 (Chernoff Bounds). Consider n i.i.d. random variables X1 . . . Xn with values
in [0, 1]. Let X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi be their average, and let ν = E[X]. Then:
min ( Pr[X − ν > δν], Pr[ν −X > δν] ) < e−νnδ2/3 for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
4 Full rationality (HardMax)
In this section, we will consider the version in which the agents are fully rational, in the
sense that their response function is HardMax. We show that principals are not incentivized
to explore— i.e., to deviate from DynamicGreedy. The core technical result is that if one
principal adopts DynamicGreedy, then the other principal loses all agents as soon as he
deviates.
To make this more precise, let us say that two MAB algorithms deviate at (local) step n
if there is an action a ∈ A and a set of step-n histories of positive probability such that any
history h in this set is feasible for both algorithms, and under this history the two algorithms
choose action a with different probability.
I Theorem 2. Assume HardMax response function with fair tie-breaking. Assume that alg1
is DynamicGreedy, and alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some (local) step
n0 < T . Then all agents in global rounds t ≥ n0 select principal 1.
I Corollary 3. The competition game between principals has a unique Nash equilibirium:
both principals choose DynamicGreedy.
I Remark. This corollary holds under a more general model which allows time-discounting:
namely, the utility of each principal i in each global round t is Ui,t(rt) if this principal is
chosen, and 0 otherwise, where Ui,t(·) is an arbitrary non-decreasing function with Ui,t(0) > 0.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof starts with two auxiliary lemmas: that deviating from DynamicGreedy implies
a strictly smaller Bayesian-expected reward, and that HardMax implies a “sudden-death”
property: if one agent chooses principal 1 with certainty, then so do all subsequent agents do.
We re-use both lemmas in later sections, so we state them in sufficient generality.
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I Lemma 4. Assume that alg1 is DynamicGreedy, and alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy
starting from some (local) step n0 < T . Then rew1(n0) > rew2(n0). This holds for any
response function fresp.
Lemma 4 does not rely on any particular shape of the response function because it only
considers the performance of each algorithm without competition.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n0 − 1 steps, it follows
by symmetry that histories H1,n0 and H2,n0 have the same distribution. We use a coupling
argument: w.l.o.g., we assume the two histories coincide, H1,n0 = H2,n0 = H.
At local step n0, DynamicGreedy chooses an action a1,n0 = a1,n0(H) which maximizes
the posterior mean reward given history H: for any realized history h ∈ support(H) and
any action a ∈ A
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) ≥ PMR(a | H = h). (6)
By assumption (4), it follows that
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) > PMR(a | H = h) for any h ∈ support(H) and a 6= a1,n0(h). (7)
Since the two algorithms deviate at step n0, there is a set S ⊂ support(H) of step-n0
histories such that Pr[S] > 0 and any history h ∈ S satisfies Pr[a2,n0 6= a1,n0 | H = h] > 0.
Combining this with (7), we deduce that
PMR(a1,n0 | H = h) > E
[
µa2,n0 | H = h
]
for each history h ∈ S. (8)
Using (6) and (8) and integrating over realized histories h, we obtain rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
J
I Lemma 5. Consider HardMax response function with fresp(0) ≥ 12 . Suppose alg1 is
monotone, and PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) for some global round t0. Then PMR1(t) > PMR2(t) for all
subsequent rounds t.
Proof. Let us use induction on round t ≥ t0, with the base case t = t0. Let N = N1,t0
be the agents’ posterior distribution for n1,t0 , the number of global rounds before t0 in
which principal 1 is chosen. By induction, all agents from t0 to t− 1 chose principal 1, so
PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t). Therefore,
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1 + t− t0)] ≥ E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1)] = PMR1(t0) > PMR2(t0) = PMR2(t),
where the first inequality holds because alg1 is monotone, and the second one is the base
case. J
Proof of Theorem 2. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n0 − 1 steps, it follows
by symmetry that rew1(n) = rew2(n) for any n < n0. By Lemma 4, rew1(n0) > rew2(n0).
Recall that ni(t) is the number of global rounds s < t in which principal i is chosen,
and Ni,t is the agents’ posterior distribution for this quantity. By symmetry, each agent
t < n0 chooses a principal uniformly at random. It follows that N1,n0 = N2,n0 (denote both
distributions by N for brevity), and N (n0 − 1) > 0. Therefore:
PMR1(n0) = E
n∼N
[rew1(n+ 1)] =
n0−1∑
n=0
N (n) · rew1(n+ 1)
> N (n0 − 1) · rew2(n0) +
n0−2∑
n=0
N (n) · rew2(n+ 1)
= E
n∼N
[rew2(n+ 1)] = PMR2(n0) (9)
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So, agent n0 chooses principal 1. By Lemma 5 (noting that DynamicGreedy is monotone),
all subsequent agents choose principal 1, too. J
4.2 HardMax with biased tie-breaking
The HardMax model is very sensitive to the tie-breaking rule. For starters, if ties are broken
deterministically in favor of principal 1, then principal 1 can get all agents no matter what
the other principal does, simply by using StaticGreedy.
I Theorem 6. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) = 1 (ties are always broken
in favor of principal 1). If alg1 is StaticGreedy, then all agents choose principal 1.
Proof. Agent 1 chooses principal 1 because of the tie-breaking rule. Since StaticGreedy is
trivially monotone, all the subsequent agents choose principal 1 by an induction argument
similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 5. J
A more challenging scenario is when the tie-breaking is biased in favor of principal 1, but
not deterministically so: fresp(0) > 12 . Then this principal also has a “winning strategy” no
matter what the other principal does. Specifically, principal 1 can get all but the first few
agents, under a mild technical assumption that DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy.
Principal 1 can use DynamicGreedy, or any other monotone MAB algorithm that coincides
with DynamicGreedy in the first few steps.
I Theorem 7. Assume HardMax response function with fresp(0) > 12 (i.e., tie-breaking is
biased in favor of principal 1). Assume the prior P is such that DynamicGreedy deviates
from StaticGreedy starting from some step n0. Suppose that principal 1 runs a monotone
MAB algorithm that coincides with DynamicGreedy in the first n0 steps. Then all agents
t ≥ n0 choose principal 1.
Proof. The proof re-uses Lemmas 4 and 5, which do not rely on fair tie-breaking.
Because of the biased tie-breaking, for each global round t we have:
if PMR1(t) ≥ PMR2(t) then Pr[it = 1] > 12 . (10)
Recall that it is the principal chosen in global round t.
Let m0 be the first step when alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy, or DynamicGreedy
deviates from StaticGreedy, whichever comes sooner. Then alg2, DynamicGreedy and
StaticGreedy coincide on the first m0 − 1 steps. Moreover, m0 ≤ n0 (since DynamicGreedy
deviates from StaticGreedy at step n0), so alg1 coincides with DynamicGreedy on the first
m0 steps.
So, rew1(n) = rew2(n) for each step n < m0, because alg1 and alg2 coincide on
the first m0 − 1 steps. Moreover, if alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy at step m0 then
rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by Lemma 4; else, we trivially have rew1(m0) = rew2(m0). To
summarize:
rew1(n) ≥ rew2(n) for all steps n ≤ m0. (11)
We claim that Pr[it = 1] > 12 for all global rounds t ≤ m0. We prove this claim using
induction on t. The base case t = 1 holds by (10) and the fact that in step 1, DynamicGreedy
chooses the arm with the highest prior mean reward. For the induction step, we assume that
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Pr[it = 1] > 12 for all global rounds t < t0, for some t0 ≤ m0. It follows that distribution
N1,t0 stochastically dominates distribution N2,t0 .6 Observe that
PMR1(t0) = E
n∼N1,t0
[rew1(n+ 1)] ≥ E
n∼N2,t0
[rew2(n+ 1)] = PMR2(t0). (12)
So the induction step follows by (10). Claim proved.
Now let us focus on global round m0, and denote Ni = Ni,m0 . By the above claim,
N1 stochastically dominates N2, and moreover Ni(m0 − 1) > Ni(m0 − 1). (13)
By definition of m0, either (i) alg2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from local
step m0, which implies rew1(m0) > rew2(m0) by Lemma 4, or (ii) DynamicGreedy deviates
from StaticGreedy starting from local step m0, which implies rew1(m0) > rew1(m0 − 1) by
Lemma 19. In both cases, using (11) and (13), it follows that the inequality in (12) is strict
for t0 = m0.
Therefore, agent m0 chooses principal 1, and by Lemma 5 so do all subsequent agents. J
5 Relaxed rationality: HardMax & Random
This section is dedicated to the HardMax&Random response model, where each principal
is always chosen with some positive baseline probability. The main technical result for
this model states that a principal with asymptotically better BIR wins by a large margin:
after a “learning phase” of constant duration, all agents choose this principal with maximal
possible probability fresp(1). For example, a principal with BIR(n) ≤ O˜(n−1/2) wins over
a principal with BIR(n) ≥ Ω(n−1/3). However, this positive result comes with a significant
caveat detailed in Section 5.1.
We formulate and prove a cleaner version of the result, followed by a more general
formulation developed in a subsequent Remark 5. We need to express a property that alg1
eventually catches up and surpasses alg2, even if initially it receives only a fraction of traffic.
For the cleaner version, we assume that both algorithms are well-defined for an infinite time
horizon, so that their BIR does not depend on the time horizon T of the game. Then this
property can be formalized as:
(∀ > 0) BIR1(n)/BIR2(n)→ 0. (14)
In fact, a weaker version of (14) suffices: denoting 0 = fresp(−1), for some constant n0 we
have
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR1(0n/2)/BIR2(n) < 12 . (15)
We also need a very mild technical assumption on the “bad” algorithm:
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR2(n) > 4 e−0n/12. (16)
I Theorem 8. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Suppose both algorithms are
monotone and well-defined for an infinite time horizon, and satisfy (15) and (16). Then
each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with maximal possible probability fresp(1) = 1− 0.
6 For random variables X,Y on R, we say that X stochastically dominates Y if Pr[X ≥ x] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ x]
for any x ∈ R.
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Proof. Consider global round t ≥ n0. Recall that each agent chooses principal 1 with
probability at least fresp(−1) > 0.
Then E[n1(t+ 1)] ≥ 20 t. By Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 1), we have that n1(t+ 1) ≥ 0t
holds with probability at least 1− q, where q = exp(−0t/12).
We need to prove that PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) > 0. For any m1 and m2, consider the quantity
∆(m1,m2) := BIR2(m2 + 1)− BIR1(m1 + 1).
Whenever m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1 and m2 < t, it holds that
∆(m1,m2) ≥ ∆(0t/2, t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2.
The above inequalities follow, resp., from algorithms’ monotonicity and (15). Now,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2)]
≥ −q + E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[∆(m1,m2) | m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1]
≥ BIR2(t)/2− q
> BIR2(t)/4 > 0 (by (16)). J
I Remark. Many standard MAB algorithms in the literature are parameterized by the time
horizon T . Regret bounds for such algorithms usually include a polylogarithmic dependence
on T . In particular, a typical upper bound for BIR has the following form:
BIR(n | T ) ≤ polylog(T ) · n−γ for some γ ∈ (0, 12 ]. (17)
Here we write BIR(n | T ) to emphasize the dependence on T .
We generalize (15) to handle the dependence on T : there exists a number T0 and a
function n0(T ) ∈ polylog(T ) such that
(∀T ≥ T0, n ≥ n0(T )) BIR1(0n/2 | T )BIR2(n | T ) <
1
2 . (18)
If this holds, we say that alg1 BIR-dominates alg2.
We provide a version of Theorem 8 in which algorithms are parameterized with time
horizon T and condition (15) is replaced with (18); its proof is very similar and is omitted.
To state a game-theoretic corollary of Theorem 8, we consider a version of the competition
game between the two principals in which they can only choose from a finite set A of monotone
MAB algorithms. One of these algorithms is “better” than all others; we call it the special
algorithm. Unless specified otherwise, it BIR-dominates all other allowed algorithms. The
other algorithms satisfy (16). We call this game the restricted competition game.
I Corollary 9. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Consider the restricted compet-
ition game with special algorithm alg. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , this
game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
5.1 A little greedy goes a long way
Given any monotone MAB algorithm other than DynamicGreedy, we design a modified
algorithm which learns at a slower rate, yet “wins the game” in the sense of Theorem 8. As
a corollary, the competition game with unrestricted choice of algorithms typically does not
have a Nash equilibrium.
Given an algorithm alg1 that deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from step n0 and a
“mixing” parameter p, we will construct a modified algorithm as follows.
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1. The modified algorithm coincides with alg1 (and DynamicGreedy) for the first n0 − 1
steps;
2. In each step n ≥ n0, alg1 is invoked with probability 1 − p, and with the remaining
probability p does the “greedy choice”: chooses an action with the largest posterior mean
reward given the current information collected by alg1.
For a cleaner comparison between the two algorithms, the modified algorithm does not record
rewards received in steps with the “greedy choice”. Parameter p > 0 is the same for all steps.
I Theorem 10. Assume symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Let 0 = fresp(−1)
be the baseline probability. Suppose alg1 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some
step n0. Let alg2 be the modified algorithm, as described above, with mixing parameter p
such that (1 − 0)(1 − p) > 0. Then each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 2 with maximal
possible probability 1− 0.
I Corollary 11. Suppose that both principals can choose any monotone MAB algorithm, and
assume the symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Then for any time horizon T ,
the only possible pure Nash equilibrium is one where both principals choose DynamicGreedy.
Moreover, no pure Nash equilibrium exists when some algorithm “dominates” DynamicGreedy
in the sense of (18) and the time horizon T is sufficiently large.
I Remark. The modified algorithm performs exploration at a slower rate. Let us argue how
this may translate into a larger BIR compared to the original algorithm. Let BIR′1(n) be the
BIR of the “greedy choice” fter after n− 1 steps of alg1. Then
BIR2(n) = E
m∼(n0−1)+Binomial(n−n0+1,1−p)
[(1− p) · BIR1(m) + p · BIR′1(m)] . (19)
In this expression, m is the number of times alg1 is invoked in the first n steps of the
modified algorithm. Note that E[m] = n0 − 1 + (n− n0 + 1)(1− p) ≥ (1− p)n.
Suppose BIR1(n) = βn−γ for some constants β, γ > 0. Further, assume BIR′1(n) ≥
c BIR1(n), for some c > 1− γ. Then for all n ≥ n0 and small enough p > 0 it holds that:
BIR2(n) ≥ (1− p+ pc) E[ BIR1(m) ]
E[ BIR1(m) ] ≥ BIR1( E[m] ) (By Jensen’s inequality)
≥ BIR1( (1− p)n ) (since E[m] ≥ n(1− p))
≥ β · n−γ · (1− p)−γ (plugging in BIR1(n) = βn−γ)
> BIR1(n) (1− pγ)−1 (since (1− p)γ < 1− pγ).
BIR2(n) > α · BIR1(n), where α = 1−p+pc1−pγ > 1.
(In the above equations, all expectations are over m distributed as in (19).)
Proof of Theorem 10. Let rew′1(n) denote the Bayesian-expected reward of the “greedy
choice” after after n− 1 steps of alg1. Note that rew1(·) and rew′1(·) are non-decreasing: the
former because alg1 is monotone and the latter because the “greedy choice” is only improved
with an increasing set of observations. Therefore, the modified algorithm alg2 is monotone
by (19).
By definition of the “greedy choice,” rew1(n) ≤ rew′1(n) for all steps n. Moreover, by
Lemma 4, alg1 has a strictly smaller rew(n0) compared to DynamicGreedy; so, rew1(n0) <
rew2(n0).
Let alg denote a copy of alg1 that is running “inside” the modified algorithm alg2. Let
m2(t) be the number of global rounds before t in which the agent chooses principal 2 and
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alg is invoked; in other words, it is the number of agents seen by alg before global round t.
LetM2,t be the agents’ posterior distribution for m2(t).
We claim that in each global round t ≥ n0, distributionM2,t stochastically dominates
distribution N1,t, and PMR1(t) < PMR2(t). We use induction on t. The base case t = n0 holds
becauseM2,t = N1,t (because the two algorithms coincide on the first n0 − 1 steps), and
PMR1(n0) < PMR2(n0) is proved as in (9), using the fact that rew1(n0) < rew2(n0).
The induction step is proved as follows. The induction hypothesis for global round t− 1
implies that agent t− 1 is seen by alg with probability (1− 0)(1− p), which is strictly larger
than 0, the probability with which this agent is seen by alg2. Therefore,M2,t stochastically
dominates N1,t.
PMR1(t) = E
n∼N1,t
[rew1(n+ 1)]
≤ E
m∼M2,t
[rew1(m+ 1)] (20)
< E
m∼M2,t
[(1− p) · rew1(m+ 1) + p · rew′1(m+ 1)] (21)
= PMR2(t).
Here inequality (20) holds because rew1(·) is monotone andM2,t stochastically dominates
N1,t, and inequality (21) holds because rew1(n0) < rew2(n0) andM2,t(n0) > 0.7 J
6 SoftMax response function
This section is devoted to the SoftMax model. We recover a positive result under the
assumptions from Theorem 8 (albeit with a weaker conclusion), and then proceed to a much
more challenging result under weaker assumptions. We start with a formal definition:
I Definition 12. A response function fresp is SoftMax if the following conditions hold:
fresp(·) is bounded away from 0 and 1: fresp(·) ∈ [, 1− ] for some  ∈ (0, 12 ),
the response function fresp(·) is “smooth” around 0:
∃ constants δ0, c0, c′0 > 0 ∀x ∈ [−δ0, δ0] c0 ≤ f ′resp(x) ≤ c′0. (22)
fair tie-breaking: fresp(0) = 12 .
I Remark. This definition is fruitful when parameters c0 and c′0 are close to 12 . Throughout,
we assume that alg1 is better than alg2, and obtain results parameterized by c0. By
symmetry, one could assume that alg2 is better than alg1, and obtain similar results
parameterized by c′0.
Our first result is a version of Theorem 8, with the same assumptions about the algorithms
and essentially the same proof. The conclusion is much weaker: we can only guarantee
that each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal 1 with probability slightly larger than 12 . This
is essentially unavoidable in a typical case when both algorithms satisfy BIR(n) → 0, by
Definition 12.
I Theorem 13. Assume SoftMax response function. Suppose alg1 has better BIR in the
sense of (15), and alg2 satisfies the condition (16). Then each agent t ≥ n0 chooses principal
1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + c04 BIR2(t). (23)
7 If rew1(·) is strictly increasing, then inequality (20) is strict, too; this is becauseM2,t(t−1) > N1,t(t−1).
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Proof Sketch. We follow the steps in the proof of Theorem 8 to derive
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) ≥ BIR2(t)/2− q, where q = exp(−0t/12).
This is at least BIR2(t)/4 by (16). Then (23) follows by the smoothness condition (22). J
We recover a version of Corollary 9, if each principal’s utility is the number of users
(rather than the more general model in (5)). We also need a mild technical assumption that
cumulative Bayesian regret (BReg) tends to infinity. BReg is a standard notion from the
literature (along with BIR):
BReg(n) := n · E
µ∼Pmean
[
max
a∈A
µa
]
−
n∑
n=1
rew(n′) =
n∑
n′=1
BIR(n′). (24)
I Corollary 14. Assume that the response function is SoftMax, and each principal’s utility
is the number of users. Consider the restricted competition game with special algorithm alg,
and assume that all other allowed algorithms satisfy BReg(n)→∞. Then, for any sufficiently
large time horizon T , this game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
Further, we prove a much more challenging result in which the condition (15) is replaced
with a much weaker “BIR-dominance” condition. For clarity, we will again assume that both
algorithms are well-defined for an infinite time horizon. The weak BIR dominance condition
says there exist constants β0, α0 ∈ (0, 1/2) and n0 such that
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR1((1− β0)n)BIR2(n) < 1− α0. (25)
If this holds, we say that alg1 weakly BIR-dominates alg2. Note that the condition
(18) involves sufficiently small multiplicative factors (resp., 0/2 and 12 ), the new condition
replaces them with factors that can be arbitrarily close to 1.
We make a mild assumption on alg1 that its BIR1(n) tends to 0. Formally, for any  > 0,
there exists some n() such that
(∀n ≥ n()) BIR1(n) ≤ . (26)
We also require a slightly stronger version of the technical assumption (16): for some n0,
(∀n ≥ n0) BIR2(n) ≥ 4
α0
exp
(−min{0, 1/8}n
12
)
(27)
I Theorem 15. Assume the SoftMax response function. Suppose alg1 weakly-BIR-dominates
alg2, alg1 satisfies (26), and alg2 satisfies (27). Then there exists some t0 such that each
agent t ≥ t0 chooses principal 1 with probability
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 + c0α04 BIR2(t). (28)
The main idea behind our proof is that even though alg1 may have a slower rate of
learning in the beginning, it will gradually catch up and surpass alg2. We will describe this
process in two phases. In the first phase, alg1 receives a random agent with probability at
least fresp(−1) = 0 in each round. Since BIR1 tends to 0, the difference in BIRs between
the two algorithms is also diminishing. Due to the SoftMax response function, alg1 attracts
each agent with probability at least 1/2−O(β0) after a sufficient number of rounds. Then
the game enters the second phase: both algorithms receive agents at a rate close to 12 , and
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the fractions of agents received by both algorithms — n1(t)/t and n2(t)/t — also converge
to 12 . At the end of the second phase and in each global round afterwards, the counts n1(t)
and n2(t) satisfy the weak BIR-dominance condition, in the sense that they both are larger
than n0 and n1(t) ≥ (1 − β0) n2(t). At this point, alg1 actually has smaller BIR, which
reflected in the PMRs eventually. Accordingly, from then on alg1 attracts agents at a rate
slightly larger than 12 . We prove that the “bump” over
1
2 is at least on the order of BIR2(t).
Proof of Theorem 15. Let β1 = min{c′0δ0, β0/20} with δ0 defined in (22). Recall each
agent chooses alg1 with probability at least fresp(−1) = 0. By condition (26) and (27),
there exists some sufficiently large T1 such that for any t ≥ T1, BIR1(0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0 and
BIR2(t) > e−0t/12. Moreover, for any t ≥ T1, we know E[n1(t + 1)] ≥ 0 t, and by the
Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 1), we have n1(t + 1) ≥ 0t/2 holds with probability at least
1− q1(t) with q1(t) = exp(−0t/12) < BIR2(t). It follows that for any t ≥ T1,
PMR2(t)− PMR1(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[BIR1(m1 + 1)− BIR2(m2 + 1)]
≤ q1(t) + E
m1∼N1,t
[BIR1(m1 + 1) | m1 ≥ 0t/2− 1]− BIR2(t)
≤ BIR1(0T1/2) ≤ β1/c′0
Since the response function fresp is c′0-Lipschitz in the neighborhood of [−δ0, δ0], each agent
after round T1 will choose alg1 with probability at least
pt ≥ 12 − c
′
0 (PMR2(t)− PMR1(t)) ≥
1
2 − β1.
Next, we will show that there exists a sufficiently large T2 such that for any t ≥ T1 + T2,
with high probability n1(t) > max{n0, (1− β0)n2(t)}, where n0 is defined in (25). Fix any
t ≥ T1 + T2. Since each agent chooses alg1 with probability at least 1/2− β1, by Chernoff
Bounds (Theorem 1) we have with probability at least 1− q2(t) that the number of agents
that choose alg1 is at least β0(1/2− β1)t/5, where the function
q2(x) = exp
(−(1/2− β1)(1− β0/5)2x
3
)
.
Note that the number of agents received by alg2 is at most T1 + (1/2 +β1)t+ (1/2−β1)(1−
β0/5)t.
Then as long as T2 ≥ 5T1β0 , we can guarantee that n1(t) > n2(t)(1− β0) and n1(t) > n0
with probability at least 1− q2(t) for any t ≥ T1 + T2. Note that the weak BIR-dominance
condition in (25) implies that for any t ≥ T1 + T2 with probability at least 1− q2(t),
BIR1(n1(t)) < (1− α0)BIR2(n2(t)).
It follows that for any t ≥ T1 + T2,
PMR1(t)− PMR2(t) = E
m1∼N1,t, m2∼N2,t
[BIR2(m2 + 1)− BIR1(m1 + 1)]
≥ (1− q2(t))α0BIR2(t)− q2(t)
≥ α0BIR2(t)/4
where the last inequality holds as long as q2(t) ≤ α0BIR2(t)/4, and is implied by the condition
in (27) as long as T2 is sufficiently large. Hence, by the definition of our SoftMax response
function and assumption in (22), we have
Pr[it = 1] ≥ 12 +
c0α0BIR2(t)
4 . J
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Similar to the condition (15), we can also generalize the weak BIR-dominance condition
(25) to handle the dependence on T : there exist some T0, a function n0(T ) ∈ polylog(T ),
and constants β0, α0 ∈ (0, 1/2), such that
(∀T ≥ T0, n ≥ n0(T )) BIR1((1− β0)n | T )BIR2(n | T ) < 1− α0. (29)
We also provide a version of Theorem 13 under this more general weak BIR-dominance
condition; its proof is very similar and is omitted. The following is just a direct consequence
of Theorem 13 with this general condition.
I Corollary 16. Assume that the response function is SoftMax, and each principal’s utility is
the number of users. Consider the restricted competition game in which the special algorithm
alg weakly-BIR-dominates the other allowed algorithms, and the latter satisfy BReg(n)→∞.
Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , there is a unique Nash equilibrium: both
principals choose alg.
7 Economic implications
aseditWe frame our contributions in terms of the relationship between competitiveness and
rationality on one side, and adoption of better algorithms on the other. Recall that both
competitiveness (of the game between the two principals) and rationality (of the agents) are
controlled by the response function fresp.
Main story. Our main story concerns the restricted competition game between the two
principals where one allowed algorithm alg is “better” than the others. We track whether
and when alg is chosen in an equilibrium. We vary competitiveness/rationality by changing
the response function from HardMax (full rationality, very competitive environment) to
HardMax&Random to SoftMax (less rationality and competition). Our conclusions are as
follows:
Under HardMax, no innovation: DynamicGreedy is chosen over alg.
Under HardMax&Random, some innovation: alg is chosen as long as it BIR-dominates.
Under SoftMax, more innovation: alg is chosen as long as it weakly-BIR-dominates.8
These conclusions follow, respectively, from Corollaries 3, 9 and 14. Further, we consider the
uniform choice between the principals. It corresponds to the least amount of rationality and
competition, and (when principals’ utility is the number of agents) uniform choice provides
no incentives to innovate.9 Thus, we have an inverted-U relationship, see Figure 3.
Secondary story. Let us zoom in on the symmetric HardMax&Random model. Competitive-
ness and rationality within this model are controlled by the baseline probability 0 = fresp(−1),
which goes smoothly between the two extremes of HardMax (0 = 0) and the uniform choice
(0 = 12 ). Smaller 0 corresponds to increased rationality and increased competitiveness. For
clarity, we assume that principal’s utility is the number of agents.
8 This is a weaker condition, the better algorithm is chosen in a broader range of scenarios.
9 On the other hand, if principals’ utility is somewhat aligned with agents’ welfare, as in (5), then a
monopolist principal is incentivized to choose the best possible MAB algorithm (namely, to minimize
cumulative Bayesian regret BReg(T )). Accordingly, monopoly would result in better social welfare than
competition, as the latter is likely to split the market and cause each principal to learn more slowly.
This is a very generic and well-known effect regarding economies of scale.
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Competitiveness/Rationality
Better algorithm in equilibrium
Uniform SoftMax HardMax&RandomHardMax
Figure 3 The stylized inverted-U relationship in the “main story”.
0
marginal utility
Uniform
0
HardMax
1/2
Figure 4 The stylized inverted-U relationship from the “secondary story”
We consider the marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm. Suppose initially both
principals use some algorithm alg, and principal 1 ponders switching to another algorithm
alg’ which BIR-dominates alg. We are interested in the marginal utility of this switch.
Then:
0 = 0 (HardMax): the marginal utility can be negative if alg is DynamicGreedy.
0 near 0: only a small marginal utility can be guaranteed, as it may take a long time
for alg′ to “catch up” with alg, and hence less time to reap the benefits.
“medium-range” 0: large marginal utility, as alg′ learns fast and gets most agents.
0 near 12 : small marginal utility, as principal 1 gets most agents for free no matter
what.
The familiar inverted-U shape is depicted in Figure 4.
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A Background on multi-armed bandits
This appendix provides some pertinent background on multi-armed bandits (MAB). We
discuss BIR and monotonicity of several MAB algorithms, touching upon: DynamicGreedy
and StaticGreedy (Section A.1), “naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and
exploitation (Section A.2), and “smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and
exploitation (Section A.3).
As we do throughout the paper, we focus on MAB with i.i.d. rewards and a Bayesian
prior; we call it Bayesian MAB for brevity.
A.1 DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy
We provide an example when DynamicGreedy and StaticGreedy have constant BIR, and
prove monotonicity of DynamicGreedy. For the example, it suffices to consider deterministic
rewards (for each action a, the realized reward is always equal to the mean µa) and independent
priors (according to the prior Pmean, random variables µ1 , . . . , µK are mutually independent)
each of full support.
The following claim is immediate from the definition of the CDF function
I Claim 17. Assume independent priors. Let Fi be the CDF of the mean reward µi of
action ai ∈ A. Then, for any numbers z2 > z1 > E[µ2] we have Pr[µ1 ≤ z1 and µ2 ≥ z2] =
F1(z1)(1− F2(z2)).
We can now draw an immediate corollary of the above claim
I Corollary 18. Consider any problem instance of Bayesian MAB with two actions and
independent priors which are full support. Then:
(a) With constant probability, StaticGreedy has a constant BIR for all steps.
(b) Assuming deterministic rewards, with constant probability DynamicGreedy has a constant
BIR for all steps.
I Remark. A similar result holds for rewards which are distributed as Bernoulli random
variables. In this case we consider accumulative reward of an action as a random walk, and
use a high probability variation of the law of iterated logarithms. (Details omitted.)
Next, we show that DynamicGreedy is monotone.
I Lemma 19. DynamicGreedy is monotone, in the sense that rew(n) is non-decreasing.
Further, rew(n) is strictly increasing for every time step n with Pr[an 6= an+1] > 0.
Proof. We prove by induction on n that rew(n) ≤ rew(n+ 1) for DynamicGreedy. Let an
be the random variable recommended at time t, then E[µan |In] = rew(n). We can rewrite
this as:
rew(n) = E
In
[E
rn
[µan |rn, In]] = EIn+1[µan |In+1]
since In+1 = (In, rn). At time n+ 1 DynamicGreedy will select an action an+1 such that:
rew(n+ 1) = E[µan+1 |In+1] ≥ E[µan |In] = rew(n)
which proves the monotonicity. In cases that Pr[an 6= an+1] > 0] we have a strict inequality,
since with some probability we select a better action then the realization of an. J
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A.2 “Naive” MAB algorithms that separate exploration and
exploitation
MAB algorithm ExplorExploit (m) initially explores each action with m agents and for the
remaining T − |A|m agents recommends the action with the highest observed average. In
the explore phase it assigns a random permutation of the mK recommendations.
I Lemma 20. The ExplorExploit (T 2/3 log |A|/δ) algorithm has, with probability 1 − δ,
for any n ≥ |A|T 2/3 we have BIR (n) = O(T−1/3). In addition, ExplorExploit (m) is
monotone.
Proof. In the explore phase we we approximate for each action a ∈ A, the value of µa by µˆa.
Using the standard Chernoff bounds we have that with probability 1− δ, for every action
a ∈ A we have |µa − µˆa| ≤ T−1/3.
Let a∗ = arg maxa µa and aee the action that ExplorExploit selects in the explore phase
after the first |A|T 2/3 agents. Since µˆa∗ ≤ µˆaee , this implies that µa∗ − µaee = O(T−1/3).
To show that ExplorExploit (m) is monotone, we need to show only that rew(mK) ≤
rew(mK + 1). This follows since for any t < mK we have rew(t) = rew(t + 1), since the
recommended action is uniformly distributed for each time t. Also, for any t ≥ mK + 1 we
have rew(t) = rew(t+ 1) since we are recommending the same exploration action. The proof
that rew(mK) ≤ rew(mK + 1) is the same as for DynamicGreedy in Lemma 19. J
We can also have a a phased version which we call PhasedExplorExploit (mt), where
time is partition in to phases. In phase t we have mt agents and a random subset of K
explore the actions (each action explored by a single agent) and the other agents exploit.
(This implies that we need that mt ≥ K for all t. We also assume that mt is monotone in t.)
I Lemma 21. Consider the case that K = 2 and the rewards of the actions are Bernoulli r.v.
with parameter µi and ∆ = µ1 − µ2. Algorithm PhasedExplorExploit (mt) is monotone
and for mt =
√
t it has BIR(n) = O(n−1/3 + e−O(∆2n2/3))).
Proof. We first show that it is monotone. Recall that µ1 > µ2. Let Si =
∑t
j=1 ri,j be the sum
of the rewards of action i up to phase t. We need to show that Pr[S1 > S2]+(1/2) Pr[S1 = S2]
is monotonically increasing in t. Consider the random variable Z = S1 − S2. At each phase
it increases by +1 with probability µ1(1− µ2), decreases by −1 with probability (1− µ1)µ2
and otherwise does not change.
Consider the values of Z up to phase t. We really care only about the probability that is
shifted from positive to negative and vice versa.
First, consider the probability that Z = 0. We can partition it to S1 = S2 = r events,
and let p(r, r) be the probability of this event. For each such event, we have p(r, r)µ1 moved
to Z = +1 and p(r, r)µ2 moved to Z = −1. Since µ1 > µ2 we have that p(r, r)µ1 ≥ p(r, r)µ2
(note that p(r, r) might be zero, so we do not have a strict inequality).
Second, consider the probability that Z = +1 or Z = −1. We can partition it to
S1 = r + 1;S2 = r and S1 = r;S2 = r + 1 events, and let p(r + 1, r) and p(r, r + 1) be the
probabilities of those events. It is not hard to see that p(r + 1, r)µ2 = p(r, r + 1)µ1. This
implies that the probability mass moved from Z = +1 to Z = 0 is identical to that moved
from Z = −1 to Z = 0.
We have showed that Pr[S1 > S2]+(1/2) Pr[S1 = S2] and therefore the expected valued of
the exploit action is non-decreasing. Since we have that the size of the phases are increasing,
the BIR is strictly increasing between phases and identical within each phase.
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We now analyze the BIR regret. Note that agent n is in phase O(n2/3) and the length of
his phase is O(n1/3). The BIR has two parts. The first is due to the exploration, which is
at most O(n−1/3). The second is due to the probability that we exploit the wrong action.
This happens with probability Pr[S1 < S2] + (1/2) Pr[S1 = S2] which we can bound using a
Chernoff bound by e−O(∆2n2/3), since we explored each action O(n2/3) times. J
I Remark. Actually we have a tradeoff depending on the parametermt between the regret due
to exploration and exploitation. (Note that the monotonicity is always guarantee assuming
mt is monotone.) If we can set that mt = 2t then at time n we have 2/n probability of an
exploit action. For the explore action we are in phase logn so the probability of a sub-optimal
explore action is n−O(∆−2). This should give us BIR(n) = O(n−O(∆−2)).
A.3 “Smart” MAB algorithms that combine exploration and
exploitation
MAB algorithm SuccesiveEliminationReset works as follows. It keeps a set of surviving
actions As ⊆ A, where initially As = A. The agents are partition into phases, where each
phase is a random permutation of the non-eliminated actions. Let µˆi,t be the average of the
rewards of action i up to phase t and µˆ∗ = maxi µˆi,t. We eliminate action i at the end of
phase t, i.e., delete it from As, if µˆ∗t − µˆi,t > log(T/δ)/
√
t. In SuccesiveEliminationReset
we simply reset the algorithm with A = As −Ae,t, where Ae,t is the set of eliminated actions
after phase t. Namely, we restart µˆi,t and ignore the old rewards before the elimination.
I Lemma 22. The algorithm SuccesiveEliminationReset, has, with probability 1− δ, BIR
(n) = O(log(T/δ)/
√
n/K).
Proof. Let the best action be a∗ = arg maxa µa. With probability 1− δ at any time n we
have that for any action i ∈ As that |µˆi − µi| ≤ log(T/δ)/
√
n/K, and a∗ ∈ As. This implies
that any action a such µa∗ − µa > 3 log(T/δ)/
√
n/K is eliminated. Therefore, any action in
As has BIR (n) of at most 6 log(T/δ)/
√
n/K. J
I Lemma 23. Assume that if µi ≥ µj then the rewards ri stochastically dominates the
rewards rj. Then, SuccesiveEliminationReset is monotone
Proof. Consider the first time T an action is eliminated, and let T = τ be a realized value
of T . Then, clearly for n < τ we have rew(n) = rew(1) .
Consider two actions a1, a2 ∈ A, such that µa1 ≥ µa2 . At time T = τ , the probability
that a1 is eliminated is smaller than the probability that a2 is eliminated. This follows
since µˆa1 stochastically dominates µˆa2 , which implies that for any threshold θ we have
Pr[µˆa1 ≥ θ] ≥ Pr[µˆa2 ≥ θ].
After the elimination we consider the expected reward of the eliminated action
∑
i∈A µiqi,
where qi is the probability that action i was eliminated in time T = τ . We have that qi ≤ qi+1,
from the probabilities of elimination.
The sum
∑
i∈A µiqi with qi ≤ qi+1 and
∑
i qi = 1 is maximized by setting qi = 1/|A|. (We
can see that if there are qi 6= 1/|A|, then there are two qi < qi+1, and one can see that setting
both to (qi + qi+1)/2 increases the value.) Therefore we have that the rew(τ) ≥ rew(τ − 1).
Now we can continue by induction. For the induction, we can show the property for any
remaining set of at most k− 1 actions. The main issue is that SuccesiveEliminationReset
restarts from scratch, so we can use induction. J
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B Non-degeneracy via a random perturbation
We show that Assumption (4) holds almost surely under a small random perturbation of the
prior. We focus on problem instances with 0-1 rewards, and assume that the prior Pmean is
independent across arms and has a finite support.10 Consider the probability vector in the
prior for arm a:
~pa = ( Pr[µa = ν] : ν ∈ support(µa) ) .
We apply a small random perturbation independently to each such vector:
~pa ← ~pa + ~qa, where ~qa ∼ Na. (30)
Here Na is the noise distribution for arm a: a distribution over real-valued, zero-sum vectors
of dimension da = |support(µa)|. We need the noise distribution to satisfy the following
property:
∀x ∈ [−1, 1]da \ {0} Pr
q∼Na
[x · (~pa + q) 6= 0] = 1. (31)
I Theorem 24. Consider an instance of MAB with 0-1 rewards. Assume that the prior
Pmean is independent across arms, and each mean reward µa has a finite support that does
not include 0 or 1. Assume that noise distributions Na satisfy property (31). If random
perturbation (30) is applied independently to each arm a, then Eq. 4 holds almost surely for
each history h.
I Remark. As a generic example of a noise distribution which satisfies Property (31), consider
the uniform distribution N over the bounded convex set
Q =
{
q ∈ Rda | q ·~1 = 0 and ‖q‖2 ≤ 
}
,
where ~1 denotes the all-1 vector. If x = a~1 for some non-zero value of a, then (31) holds
because
x · (p+ q) = x · p = a 6= 0.
Otherwise, denote p = ~pa and observe that x · (p+ q) = 0 only if x · q = c , x · (−p). Since
x 6= ~1, the intersection Q ∩ {x · q = c} either is empty or has measure 0 in Q, which implies
Prq [x · (p+ q) 6= 0] = 1.
To prove Theorem 24, it suffices to focus on two arms, and perturb one of them. Since
realized rewards have finite support, there are only finitely many possible histories. Therefore,
it suffices to focus on a fixed history h.
I Lemma 25. Consider an instance of MAB with 0-1 rewards. Assume that the prior Pmean
is independent across arms, and that support(µ1) is finite and does not include 0 or 1. Fix
history h. Suppose random perturbation (30) is applied to arm 1, with noise distribution N1
that satisfies (31). Then E[µ1 | h] 6= E[µ2 | h] almost surely.
10The assumption of 0-1 rewards is for clarity. Our results hold under a more general assumption that
for each arm a, rewards can only take finitely many values, and each of these values is possible (with
positive probability) for every possible value of the mean reward µa.
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Proof. Note that E[µa | h] does not depend on the algorithm which produced this history.
Therefore, for the sake of the analysis, we can assume w.l.o.g. that this history has been
generated by a particular algorithm, as long as this algorithm can can produce this history
with non-zero probability. Let us consider the algorithm that deterministically chooses same
actions as h.
Let S = support(µ1). Then:
E[µ1 | h] =
∑
ν∈S
ν · Pr[µ1 = ν | h] =
∑
ν∈S
ν · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν] / Pr[h],
Pr[h] =
∑
ν∈S
Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν].
Therefore, E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] if and only if∑
ν∈S
(ν − C) · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] · Pr[µ1 = ν] = 0, where C = E[µ2 | h].
Since E[µ2 | h] and Pr[h | µ1 = ν] do not depend on the probability vector ~p1, we conclude
that
E[µ1 | h] = E[µ2 | h] ⇔ x · ~p1 = 0,
where vector
x := ( (ν − C) · Pr[h | µ1 = ν] : ν ∈ S ) ∈ [−1, 1]d1
does not depend on ~p1.
Thus, it suffices to prove that x · ~p1 6= 0 almost surely under the perturbation. In a
formula:
Pr
q∼N1
[x · (~p1 + q) 6= 0] = 1 (32)
Note that Pr[h | µ1 = ν] > 0 for all ν ∈ S, because 0, 1 6∈ S. It follows that at most one
coordinate of x can be zero. So (32) follows from property (31). J
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